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‘New Labour and the Unions: The Death of Tigmoo
1
?’   
 
The  party-union alliance ‘is part of our heritage and it is instinctive in our party and movement that 
we should keep the link. Anyone who doesn’t believe that doesn’t understand our history or the 
natural foundation of our party.’ (Jim Callaghan  in 1996. Quoted in Morgan, 1997:  745). 
 
A. A very special relationship?  
'For over 80 years‟, Minkin wrote in his definitive study, the trade union-Labour Party  link 
'has shaped the structure and, in various ways, the character of the British Left.' (Minkin, 1991: xii). 
Though, as Minkin  demonstrated in abundant detail the link,  was frequently punctuated by 
disputes, some of them serious, „the legitimacy, centrality and naturalness of the relationship were 
rarely brought into question. It was taken for granted that the unions and the party were organically 
connected‟ (Ludlam, Borah and Coates, 2002: 224).  This is no longer the case. Predictions that the 
organic interlock between Labour and the affiliated unions would disintegrate have proved wide of 
the mark. Instead is has persisted and remains a central structural characteristic of the Labour 
party, even under the „New Labour‟ regime. However, this chapter will suggest, the nature of the 
link is undergoing some fundamental alterations.  
Chris Howell suggested that the linkage between union movements and social democratic 
parties was rooted in a system of „political exchange‟.  Put in the simplest terms, this argued that 
the former supplied crucial resources (such as money, organisation) to the latter who reciprocated 
with supportive legislation. Howell contends that the material basis of this exchange is crumbling 
largely because of deep-rooted structural changes in the nature of capitalism manifested in the 
reconfiguring of patterns of power and interest. Social democratic parties have been impelled to 
formulate a new political economy which no longer assigns unions a prominent role. For this 
reason, the party-union connection is in historical decline (Howell, 2001).  
The concept of a „political exchange‟ highlights a major element of the party-union 
relationship in Britain. This relationship could never have survived a century and more, could never 
have retained its vitality and its capacity to surmount often grave conflicts unless it was held 
together by hard considerations of mutual interest. The protection of labour's industrial interests 
was the  'anvil upon which "labour alliance" forged, it was the most basic and unifying purpose of 
the Labour party' (Minkin, 1991: 11)Yet (it will be contended here)  the notion of a political 
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exchange captures only one dimension of the party-union relationship in the UK. That relationship 
was also, as  Minkin observes, „defined in terms of a common loyalty and a deeply felt commitment 
to a wider entity and purpose - the labour movement. The concept of „the movement‟ underscored 
the indissolubility of the party-union. It was   „both a description and an aspiration‟   (Minkin, 1991: 
4). As description is referred to the organic institutional entanglement between the  party and the 
affiliated unions. As aspiration it referred to shared purpose and engagement inn a common 
struggle.   The argument of this chapter, stripped to its bare essentials, is that whilst the party-union 
link as a strategic alliance will survive and continue to have a substantial effect on the organisation 
and programme of the Labour party, it is loosing it character as a movement.  The culture of shared 
norms, sentiments, ambitions and ideals which nourished the labour alliance is decomposing. „This 
great movement of our‟ –  „Tigmoo‟  in affectionate short-hand – is vanishing. 
This chapter will explore the nature of the party relationship through a glance at the policy 
record of the Blair Government. It will focus on a single, if yet very broad, question: to what extent 
did the government exhibit receptivity to unions‟ demands and interests in the fashioning of policies 
in those areas which most affected the daily lives and fortunes of their members?  How, in short, 
did the party-union connection operate in the sphere that mattered most: in tangible acts of public 
policy?  In assessing this record  the next section distinguishes between five aspects  of policy, 
each of which impinged very directly on employee interests, upon each of which there was a clear 
trade union position and  each of which caused some  contention between government and unions: 
employment, regulation of pay and conditions,  individual employee rights, collective employee 
rights and the „two-tier workforce‟. The following section will explore the factors which influenced the 
stance taken by the Government and hence the shape and of the party-union relationship.  It 
advances the proposition that the orbit  of party-union relations can best be understood in terms of 
the operation of five variables, which I call resources, interests, power and ideology. The chapter 
ends with a brief conclusion summing up the state of the party-union relationship. 
 
B. The Record of the Blair Government.   
The incoming Blair Government promised the unions  „fairness not favours‟.  „Not favours‟ meant, 
on the one hand, that the industrial relations settlement that had emerged from the Conservative 
years was, in its essentials, to be respected.   „Fairness‟, on the other, was defined principally in 
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terms of affording employees   protection against exploitation and arbitrary management and 
ending mass unemployment.  Labour‟s 1997 manifesto pledged to introduce „basic minimum rights 
for the individual at the workplace‟, to establish a minimum wage, to accord to unions the right  to 
secure recognition by employers and, finally, to revoke the Major Government refusal to sign the 
EU‟s Social Chapter which extended some protection to employees (Labour Party, 1997).    
Three major statutes have been enacted, the Employment Relations Act (ERA) of 1999, the 
Employment Act of 2002 and the Employment Relations Act of 2004.  These aimed, as far as was 
practicable, to balance and reconcile a number of objectives: to establish a network of legally 
enforceable rights for employees which would protect them against gross abuse; to facilitate unions‟ 
ability to represent the interests of their members; to foster   a spirit of harmony and co-operation 
between management and labour; and to promote higher productivity and greater competitiveness 
by sustaining a flexible labour market.   
 
1. Full employment. For no failing did Labour so relentlessly condemn the Conservatives than for 
their policies which consigned huge numbers to the dole queues. Although the scale of joblessness 
was already beginning to slacken in the final years of Tory rule it continued to stand at  a historically 
high  post-war level.  The Blair Government‟ committed itself to provide (in a rather cautious and 
nuanced formulation) „employment opportunity for all‟.  Consideration of the methods used to 
achieve this objective – ranging from active labour market policies such as the various New Deals, 
tackling   key barriers to work, such as scarcity of child care facilities, improving   financial 
incentives to work and lowering the reservation wage by tying access to social benefits more 
stringently to job search - would take us well  beyond the remit of this chapter.  But the crucial point 
is that New Labour did not abandon – as some critics alleged – full employment as a prime object 
of economic policy, indeed pursued it with energy and application.  
The results – at least compared to similar-sized  EU countries such as Germany and 
France – have been quite impressive. The percentage of the working age population in paid 
employment rose from 70.8% in 1997 to 74.7% by the end of 2004, or from 25.7 million to 27.4 
million  in numbers (Taylor, 2005: 196).  What had appeared to be the intractable problem of large 
number of young jobless was at least partially resolved. Whether its performance is quite so 
superior to continental laggards  as the Government claims  is a matter of dispute  with recent 
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research by Sheffield Hallam University suggesting that there may be as many as 1.7 million 
„hidden jobless‟ diverted on to other benefits, such as incapacity benefits (cited in Guardian June 17 
2007). But there has been  broad agreement on two points: that  much effort has been invested in 
cutting unemployment   and   that the overall impact  of New Labour policies has been positive. It is 
notable that failure to tackle unemployment has not figured on the unions‟ charge sheet against the 
Government. 
 
2. Regulation of pay and conditions. The Blair Government has  favoured some degree of re-
regulation to protect workers against exploitation in terms of both pay and working conditions whilst 
maintaining what at was proud to call the „most lightly-regulated‟ system in the EU.  Thus a priority 
in its first term was the introduction of a national minimum wage. This was a demand for which 
(some) unions had fought long and hard and had been incorporated into the party‟s programme as 
an iron pledge under the Smith leadership. A Low Pay Commission was set up entrusted with the 
right to recommend the level of the minimum wage, enacted in April 1999. At present (June 2007), 
after a number of ungradings, it   stands   at  £5.35 for adults. It has been calculated that, by 2004,  
over 1.7 million poorly paid (and mainly part-time) workers had benefited from the minimum 
wage (Vigor, 2005: 160).  Coupled with the various tax credits schemes to supplement low wages, 
the effect has been to significantly increase the earnings of the lowest income decile  (Hamann and 
Kelly, 2003: 646).    
However, the Government was left keen to regulate hours of work. In 1999 the annual 
European Labour Force Survey reported that British employees worked some of the longest hours 
in the EU (Guardian August 22, 1999).  The EU’s Working Time Regulations stipulated that 
workers must not be normally required to work over 48 hours per week. However, ignoring 
strenuous TUC representations, the Blair Government excluded millions of workers from coverage 
by   allowing workers to ‘waive’ their rights under the regulations (seeking ‘derogations’) and by 
exempting a number of occupational categories – greatly diluting the impact of the regulations. As a 
result, hours worked in the UK remain amongst the highest in the EU.  (Smith and Morton, 2001: 
123; Glyn and Wood, 2001: 63).   
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3. Extending individual employee rights. „Fairness‟ was primarily defined by the Government in 
turns of reviving employee rights which, it acknowledged, had been seriously eroded under the 
Tories. It has enacted a whole battery of individual worker rights including the right  to be 
accompanied by a trade union official during a disciplinary or grievance hearing whether or not a 
trade union was recognised, a restoration of the qualifying period for protection against unfair 
dismissal to 12 months, a very substantial raising of  the maximum compensation figure for 
unfair dismissal, and extended parental rights      (Glyn and Wood, 2001: 61; Hamann and Kelly, 
2003: 647; Howell, 2004: 9).   However, the Government has been loath to extend to part-time, 
temporary and agency workers - who number amongst the most vulnerable and poorly paid groups 
in the British labour market - the protections and rights enjoyed by workers on permanent, full-time  
contracts, often blocking and watering-down EU legislation or securing exemptions for UK 
employers.  (McKay, 2001: 294; Smith and Morton, 2006:413; Taylor, 2005: 189). 
 
4.  Extending collective employee rights. 
    The Conservative Government after 1979 launched a relentless assault on the trade unions with 
secondary action banned, mandatory strike ballots imposed and unions exposed  to legal action if 
they went on strike without fulfilling complex and detailed statutory procedures (Michie and 
Wilkinson, 1994:  17).  Even before Blair‟s arrival to the leadership,  Labour had largely abandoned 
its earlier pledges to repeal this legislation. The 1997 manifesto stated baldly that „the key elements 
of the trade union legislation of the 1980s will stay – on ballots, picketing and industrial action‟ but it 
did promise to introduce legislation to allow people to join a union and to facilitate union recognition 
(Labour party, 1997). 
Intense controversy accompanied the framing of the Blair Government‟s provisions on 
union recognition and the outcome, as it eventually emerged in the Employment Relations Act, was 
very much a compromise. For the first time a legal right of employees to trade union 
representation was established.  Two methods of statutory recognition of trade unions by 
employers for collective bargaining over pay and conditions were introduced. Under the first a union 
would be recognised if a majority of those voting and at least 40 per cent of those eligible to vote 
supported it - a (much) higher proportion than those who voted Labour in its three successive 
triumphs. Under the second the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) could insist on trade union 
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recognition where the union could show it had already recruited  a majority of the employees in the 
proposed bargaining unit (Gennard, 2002: 585; Smith and Morton, 2001: 124).
 
 
But on one point the Government was adamant: there would be no easing of the 
tough legislative framework constraining union rights to engage in industrial action. Solidarity 
action remains banned, legally permissible industrial action is defined very narrowly and 
balloting procedures required for such action are extraordinary complex and demanding. 
The UK legal regime regulating industrial action persists as one of the most restrictive in the EU 
(McKay, 2001: 297; Glyn and Wood, 2001: 61- 62; Towers, 1999: 86-7; Brown, 2000: 302-3).   
 
5. The  two-tier workforce. The two-tier workforce refers to the differences in pay and conditions 
which arise when workers are transferred from the public sector to the private sector and when new 
workers are recruited to carry out jobs previously undertaken in the public sector. The effect of this 
has been  a notable deterioration of conditions in terms of wages, employment status, holidays, 
pensions and sick pay (Toynbee, 2003: 57-9, 79). 
 Much to the anguish of the unions   far from reversing the shift of previously public 
activities to the private sector the Labour government accelerated it, especially through the rapid 
expansion of the Private Finance Initiative.  Unions‟ efforts (which notched up some victories in 
Conference votes) to deflect Government policy proved unavailing and for this reason they 
concentrated their  efforts on ending  the two-tier workforce.  They demanded that previously 
publicly-employed workers transferred to the private sector and those who moved into jobs formerly 
in the public sector – as a result of contracting-out and PFI deals - should  be guaranteed „no less 
favourable‟  terms and conditions than those still employed by the state.  The Government initially 
resisted these pressures but by early 2003 it was evident that if steps were not taken to end the 
two-tier workforce the party-union relationship would be sorely impaired. At the Warwick conference 
in July 2004 (formally a meeting of the party‟s National Policy Forum)  the Government finally  
conceded  the phasing-out of  the two-tier workforce throughout most of the public sector (UNISON 
News 26 July 2004). It was a major union achievement. 
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Summary  
In summary, it is clear that the Blair Government‟s approach to employment relations law   differs 
sharply from  both  Labour‟s traditionally collectivist stance and the highly anti-union one pursued 
by the Tories. Thus, on the one hand, it enacted many new labour rights but, on the other hand, 
they took the form, primarily, of individual  rather than collective (trade union) ones. The list of these 
individual rights is, as we have seen,  a substantial one. Union recognition has been facilitated 
and the two-tier workforce phased out and the Government has set an important precedent by 
establishing by statute a minimum wage.  On all these issues New Labour exhibited a receptivity to 
the trade unions representations that contrasted starkly with their experience under the Tories.   
            On other issues, including the retention of most of the existing legal framework 
governing the conduct of industrial disputes, the negotiation of opt-outs from EU directives and the 
insistence on preserving a lightly-regulated labour market Government measures showed scant 
sympathy towards union wishes.   Union recognition procedures are complex and cumbersome,  
the laws regulating industrial action are  highly restrictive and EU Directives have usually been 
acceded to only with „generous derogations and exceptions‟ (Undy, 1999: 331).    Further,  whilst 
the onus has been on extending employees  individual rights, these largely depend for their 
practical application (in the private sector at least) on a strong trade union presence which is 
generally lacking and, as a result, for many workers they remain paper rights.   
C. The Shaping of the party-union relationship 
This account now seeks to identify  the  determinants of the party-union relationship under the Blair 
Government.   It argues that the trajectory of party-union relations can best be understood in terms 
of the impact of five variables, which I call resources, interests, power and ideology. Some of these 
pertain to  political and organisational relationship within the Labour party, others to wider societal 
relationships. The variables not only directly impact on the party-union connection but interact in 
complex and unpredictable ways – so anyone predictions about the future have to be treated with 
caution.  As a preliminary, what follows is a very brief outline of the role affiliated unions currently 
play within the Labour party. 
Already prior to Blair‟s leadership, with their approval, the union role in Conference, the 
party‟s National Executive, the electoral college for electing the leader and deputy-leader and within 
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the candidate selection process had been slimmed down. 
2
   Initially Tony Blair and the so-called 
party „modernisers‟ toyed with the idea of a divorce between unions and party but  „settled instead 
for a weakening of the internal decision-making institutions in which the unions play a part, and for 
a reduction of the union role within those institutions‟ (Ludlam, Borah and Coates, 2002: 235). In 
1996/97   the „partnership in Power‟ proposals introduced sweeping changes in  Labour‟s 
organisation and policy process (see Shaw, 2002).  The unions lost their majority on the National 
Executive (from 17 out of 30 to 12 out of 32) and they were given just 30 seats on the new National 
Policy Forum which (in theory) was to the key policy determining body. More important in practice 
was the new Joint Policy Committee upon which there was no union presence by right and which 
the party leader effectively controlled. 
The impact of these changes were substantial, but should not be exaggerated. On the one 
hand, the unions had forfeited their domination of Conference and the NEC. But, on the other, the 
unions had never used their preponderance of votes to assert control over Labour party policy, and 
the lack of any mechanisms by which conference could enforce its wishes on a Labour government 
(or, far that matter, the PLP) meant that in practice union „barons‟ never could did or, indeed, want 
to „run the party.‟ (All this is demonstrated conclusively in Minkin, 1991).  Further, the fact that the 
capacity of unions to shape internal party policy-making had diminished did not, in practical terms, 
matter a great detail because the party itself had effectively lost its capacity (except as an 
occasional prodder) to shape government policy.  So the loss of union vote in the party‟s 
deliberative arenas did not translate into a commensurate shrinkage of influence, for that influence 
was, in practice, much less than it might seem to be. 
1. Resources   
But did not the real source of power by which unions could direct the affairs of the party 
emanate from their role as chief supplier of funds? 'He  who pays he piper plays the tune'.  There 
can be no dispute that, for most of its existence, the party has been heavily reliant on union finance 
without which it could never have sustained a mass organisation.  On the other hand, as Minkin 
demonstrated, union money was not customarily  used as weapon to badger the party. Indeed, 
'there were and remain unwritten prohibitions against open threats of financial sanctions‟ (Minkin, 
1991: 626).  Notwithstanding, party reliance on union money did create a relationship of 
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 For example, the union share of the Conference vote fell from 90% to 50% and of the 
electoral college from 40% to 33%, to be cast by individuals and not en bloc.  
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dependency and it was with the object of lessening that dependency, as well as with finding the 
means of meeting the ever greater expenses that the „professionalisation‟ of party campaigning and 
communication imposed, that sustained efforts were made to tap alternative sources of finance. 
The main alternatives were much increased state funding, a more ample subscription income  from 
an expanded membership base and private donations from wealthy benefactors. The first was 
potentially the most lucrative but was thwarted by a most distinct public reluctance to accede to it. 
The second option - building a mass membership - initially seemed encouraging. In the early years 
of the Blair leadership, Labour‟s individual membership rose impressively, to reach a peak of 
around 400,000 in 1997. Unfortunately it then began to tumble and at an accelerating rate.  By 
2007 it was estimated to have shrivelled to a dismal   180,000   – the lowest level since the 1920s. 
Mass membership had  proved „a passing fantasy‟  (McIlroy, 2007: 1). It was via the third option, 
private donations, that new income was to most abundantly flow. Labour had always had a small 
number of wealthy well-wishers (e.g. Lord Haskins of Northern Foods) but  after Blair‟s accession to 
the leadership and then  its arrival to power, their numbers grew rapidly and their munificence too. 
The proportion of the party‟s income which derived from  the  trade unions fell from around two-
thirds in 1992, to 40% by 1997 and then to 33% in 2001 (Leopold, 2006: 193). .  Sadly, however, 
New Labour was now to be hoist by its own petard. 
„Tory sleaze‟  - the exchange of money for political favours - had proved an appealing 
election slogan and Labour promised to introduce laws to clear up the Augustan stable of party 
finances. The fact that the Blair leadership almost immediately displayed an impressive willingness 
to accept large donates from businessmen, some of less than impeccable virtue with the 
assumption, furthermore, of favours produced much unfavourable publicity which lent added 
urgency to legislative action. 
3
  The  Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 
stipulated that a list of all donations to political parties above £200 had to  be submitted to an 
Electoral Commission and published,  and  the source of all national donations over £5,000 had to 
be declared  (Leopold, 2006: 193).  This meant  open season for the Tory press to publish the 
names of Labour‟s most lavish benefactors – and  any titles, favours or other benefits which, 
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  For example, Bernie Ecclestone‟s  Formula One racing interests were exempted from the ban of 
tobacco advertising.  A public interest objection which could have been lodged against the 
acquisition by Richard Desmond (who made his fortune in spicy magazines and TV channels)  
seems never to have been seriously considered. 
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coincidentally or not, these benefactors had received from a grateful government.  Not all of this   
publicity was appreciated and the copious amounts of money which had begun to flow in New 
Labour‟s direction from rich men eager to part with their money began to dry up. 
But all was not lost since  it transpired there was a loophole in the legislation.  If potential 
donors provided „loans‟ (ostensibly on a „commercial‟ basis) rather than grants then their names 
need not be published, unhelpful publicity would be avoided and generosity could be properly 
rewarded, protected from the prying eyes of the media.  It was estimated that over £20 million 
flowed into New Labour‟s coffers as a result of these secret „loans‟ – as revealed when the press 
disclosed that the prime minister had recommended  lenders for peerages. The outcome was 
extreme embarrassment when - what proved to be -  a long-running police (and still not concluded) 
investigation was launched, Tony Blair was himself interviewed by detectives  and some of his key 
aides arrested.  An Electoral Administration Act was hurriedly passed in  2006   requiring that loans  
be reported in the same way as donations (McIlroy, 2007: 4). Not entirely unexpectedly, „the supply 
of large individual and corporate donations dwindled‟   (Leopold, 2006: 193). The upshot was that, a 
mass membership having proved a mirage and with the largesse of the rich rapidly ebbing, the 
party remained heavily reliant on the unions. 
In fact, it was becoming evidence that this dependence extended beyond direct financial 
assistance.  In successive elections (research conducted by Ludlam and Taylor revealed) affiliated 
unions had played a key role in mobilizing support for the party through  providing personnel and 
organisational support as well as hard cash. Under the aegis of the umbrella body, TULO, they 
established phone banks, spearheaded voter registration drives,   organised a cadre of workers to 
carry out constituency   campaigning  and  appointed trade union co-ordinators in all of Labour's 
key seats. Research indicated that this had a significant impact  on Labour's vote share – indeed 
was „central to Labour's retention of almost all of its 146 key seats in 2001‟  (Ludlam and Taylor, 
2003: 734). Furthermore, by 2001 and, even more, 2005 it was becoming evident that the number 
of activists  willing to volunteer their services in staffing grassroots constituency electioneering was 
falling rapidly. This rapid depletion in the number of party workers   rendered the party more – not 
less – reliant upon the help (especially manpower)  the unions could supply. 
The problem, as Labour entered its second term, was ceasing to be its undue reliance on 
union cash then that some of the cash might disappear as a  result of a rash of left-wing victories in 
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union polls, including in the largest unions: Dave Prentis in  Unison, Derek Simpson in  Amicus, 
Tony Woodley in  the TGWU  - the latter two unions merged to former the biggest union in the UK, 
Unite, in 2006 -  and first Kevin Curran and then Paul Kenny in the GMB.  These (and other leaders 
in smaller unions)  represented quite a spread of opinion but they all shared a deepening 
disenchantment with key New Labour policy planks, including the expansion of the role of the 
private sector and the establishment of Foundation Trust hospitals in the NHS, tardiness in ending 
the two-tier workforce (but see above), the rapid expansion of the Private Finance Initiative, the 
retention of a highly flexible labour market, the preference for means-resting rather than universality 
in pension provision, the failure to take effective measures to reduce steep inequalities in the 
distribution of income and wealth and  a general partiality towards business.  
 Increasingly the left-wing leaders of the big unions concerted their political 
interventions in an effort to „reclaim the Labour party.  After a long period when conference seemed 
to have lapsed into docility the unions secured the passage of motions criticising major Government 
policies  including on pensions, foundation hospitals, PFI and commercial involvement in the NHS.  
The Government simply shrugged-off these defeats. Seasoned union leaders were, of course, well 
aware that adverse conference votes would have minimal impact on the Government. But what if 
they retaliated by reducing the supply of money?  In 2003 the transport union RMT, the 
communications union CWU, GMB,  and Unison all cut funding  to the party. Some of the  funds 
thus saved were   used to finance union unions campaigns against Government policies notably 
marketisation and commercialisation in the public sector (Leopold, 2006: 195). Two small unions  
(RMT and FBU)  which had bruising industrial  encounters  with the Government (in the case of the 
the FBU, the fire-fighters union, a bitter and prolonged strike) disaffiliated from the party.   
However these turned out to be isolated instances.  The slicing back of funds was intended 
primarily as a  warning shot   rather than harbingers of deeper cuts in the future.  Mainstream left-
of-centre leaders in the big unions remained unflinching adherents of the party-union link.  
Derek Simpson, the left-wing leader of the engineering union Amicus  bluntly told his 
conference that, `if anyone believes [that] anyone apart from the Labour government will do 
anything for us, you're in the wrong meeting, you're in the wrong organization' (quoted in 
Ludlam and Taylor, 2003: 739). Indeed,  the unions continued  liberally to fund the party. 
McIlroy estimated on the basis of the Electoral Commission‟s figures that they provided  some 65% 
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of outright  donations to the party. Despite the tough talking of recent years, the unions collectively 
dispensed some £56 million to the Labour Party between 2001 and 2006. „AMICUS alone gave the 
party more than £8 million, the TGWU more than £7 million, USDAW nearly £6 million and UNISON 
more than £10 million‟ (McIlroy, 2007: 8).  
There was no direct bartering, no formal quid pro quos between money and policy. Yet 
awareness of the party‟s continued dependence on the unions for financial and organisational 
assistance inevitably contributed to a state of mind more receptive to policy concessions to the 
unions, of the type detailed above. Sensitivity to union representations always increased as 
elections neared, and this was exemplified by the so-called Warwick Agreement in July 2004. This    
consisted of a series of  pledges for legislative action in a third Labour term (to be incorporated  into 
the party‟s 2005 manifesto)  including over pension provision, the  work-life balance, redundancy 
pay, the   implementation of EU directives and an extension of the two-tier workforce agreements to 
the whole of the  public sector (Heery, 2005: 11; Unison News 24 July 2004).   
 
2. Interests: New Labour‟s Political Economy 
  „The strength and content of party-union ties‟, Howell has suggested,  are „ultimately 
dependent upon a kind of bargain, or a base of overlapping material interest, which in turn is 
heavily influenced by structural economic factors‟  (Howell, 2001:12). How governments construe 
material interests – and their implications for hammering out policy – varies according to a range of 
factors including circumstance, external pressures, ideology and so forth. During the post-war 
generation, though Britain faltered in  its  efforts to  develop stable corporatist institutions on the  
North European-model, successive Labour administrations  continued to rely on trade unions to 
contain inflationary pressures, regulate industrial strife and improve Britain‟s poor productivity. The 
unions were not simply another set of pressure groups: they were essential partners in the 
economic and social governance of the country.  
By 1997 the Keynesian propositions that had underpinned this form of economic 
management were out of fashion. In the intervening years there had been „a transformation of the 
assumptions and institutions of economic policy-making which had dominated the previous 30 
years‟ (Annersely and Gamble, 2004: 145).  New Labour had no desire to resurrect Keynesian 
regulation and  economic role of the state was now  more modestly understood as to create the 
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conditions to allow market forces to work more effectively. Price stability but seen as an overriding 
economic goal but crucially was now to be secured not by incomes policies or social contracts but 
by a combination of transferring control over monetary policy to the Bank of England and 
maintaining a deregulated labour market where wage levels could be held in check  by market 
forces. Brown and his advisors were convinced that the abatement of trade union power in the 
1980s had been  a major factor in productivity improvements   and that  the waning of collective 
bargaining has rendered  significantly  higher levels of employment compatible with price stability:  
stronger union spelt fewer job  (Charlwood, 2004: 386). Indeed, it was an insistent Treasury theme 
the UK‟s „decentralised and relatively weak collective bargaining system‟ gave the country a sharp 
competitive edge (Coats, 2005: 30). 
 From this perspective it was easy to see how the needs of business gelled with 
those of the economy and the country as a whole. High profits supplied the fuel corporations 
needed to expand output, acquire new markets, create jobs  - and  thereby generate the tax 
revenues that could be used to rebuild Britain‟s public infrastructure.  Conversely, the  typical claims 
made by unions – for higher wages, greater employment security, more elaborate schemes for 
employee protection – seemed more likely to jeopardise than promote national prosperity. Indeed, 
partnership with business – and  not the unions – was, according to Blair,   „a founding principle of 
New Labour and it will not change‟ (Guardian November 6, 2001). The party was, as one minister 
put it,   „unashamedly   pro-business‟ because it was  „business   that creates wealth and jobs and 
sustains our quality of life‟ (Hewitt, 2001). This means not   that New Labour is hostile to the unions  
but envisages only a restricted role for them. „For sure‟, Brendan Barber, TUC General Secretary 
observed, New Labour ministers  „recognise our right to exist, and a citizen‟s right to join. They can 
see that individuals may benefit from belonging to a union…. But this is not the same as 
recognising that unions, and the collective bargaining and right to effective representation that we 
pursue, are in general a force for good‟ (Barber, 2003). Further, Blair himself (and many of his 
closest advisors) had a somewhat jaundiced view of the unions and the role they had played both in 
the party and the country at large. „He was unwilling to risk losing business support for New Labour 
by trying to reinstate what would have been widely seen as a discredited model of corporatism‟  
(Coats, 2005: 29). In effect, the New Labour  „modernisation project‟  „deliberately sought to develop 
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a positive and intimate relationship with business and a more arms-length and unsentimental one 
with trade unions‟ (Taylor, 2001: 246). 
 
3. Power 
No less important was the fact that the trade unions were in no position to compel  the Government 
to take a more benign  view of them. Power relationships have an impact on governments    
independent of interests, ideologies and even the search for electoral advantage. Power 
constellations structure   „actors' perceptions of a realistic and legitimate range of debate …and of 
their own capacity to shape policy in accordance with their preferences, and therefore their political 
strategies‟  (Huber and Stephens, 2001: 323).  Writing originally in the 1950s, Crosland pointed out 
that full employment and the growth in union density, cohesion and organisational capacity    „by 
transposing at once the interests, and therefore the attitudes, of the two sides, has dramatically 
altered the balance of power at every level of labour relations‟ (Crosland, 1964: 12). This balance of 
power was now being reversed.  Union membership (and density) reached its peak in 1979 when it 
stood at 13.2 million. In  the subsequent two decades it plummeted,  falling to barely 7 million when 
the Blair government came to power in 1997. At present it stands at a little below seven and a half 
million, equivalent to a union density figure of 29%. – and  less than 20%. Equally, the proportion of 
the workforce whose pay was set by collective bargaining had halved from around 70% to 35% 
(Metcalf, 2004: 4). 
 Furthermore, trade unionism in Britain operates in a chilly and inhospitable climate. A whole 
range of economic changes have undermined  union bargaining power ranging from the collapse of  
employment in former strongholds such as mining, ship-building and automobiles, the shift in 
employment from larger to smaller units of production, from manufacturing industry to the service 
sector and from areas where traditions of trade unionism were strong to those where they were 
weak. All these trends have hampered recruitment and attenuated the sentiments of solidarity and 
common interest   which are  the bases of effective union organisation (Charlwood , 2004: 393). „It 
is a sad fact‟, one former TUC official concluded,  „that we have a relatively weak trade union 
movement in the UK‟  (Coats, 2005: 29). Irrespective of their  goals Labour governments  in  the 
1960s and  the 1970s  felt they had little option in key areas of policy  but to try and hammer out 
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agreed positions in collaboration with the unions. The Blair Government neither had the disposition 
nor has felt constrained to do so.   
This is not to say that (as under the Conservative years) unions have been kept out of the 
cold. The advice and comments of trade unions were sought as a matter of routine on a whole host 
of questions. The Government provided large sums of money to help fund union training and 
educational efforts.  The TUC and senior trade unionists „now had ready access to ministers and 
their involvement in the Government‟s proliferating Task Forces afforded another opportunity to 
influence its thinking‟  (Undy, 2002: 643).  Tripartite institutions have revived. Thus trade unions 
have significant representation on new bodies such as the Low Pay Commission, the Central  
Arbitration Committee, the national Skills Alliance and the Sector Skills Councils as well as older 
organisations such as the Health and Safety Executive and the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service  (Nash, 2006: 10; Coats, 2005: 32). But there are firm limits to the role of trade 
unions within the policy process. The extensive consultation of unions by government which is an 
established part of the institutional  landscape in much of Western Europe is generally lacking. 
„There is no general social pact in New Labour‟s Britain and no standing machinery of social 
partnership‟   (Heery , 2005: 9). Unions, from the New Labour perspective, were seen to represent 
but „one pressure group among many, with no special claim on government attention, sympathy or 
support‟  (Ludlam,  Bodah  and Coates, 2000: 229).  
4. Ideology. New Labour’s unitary frame of reference 
One can take this a step further. There was something profoundly inimical to trade 
unionism at the heart of New Labour.  For New Labour‟s  principal political strategist, Philip Gould,  
‟trade union domination‟   had been    a major bar hindering Labour‟s „modernisation‟ and a major 
cause of  its bleak electoral performance since the 1970s  (Gould, 1998:  19). In the past the  party-
union relationship had been defined „in terms of a common loyalty and a deeply felt commitment to 
a wider entity and purpose - the Labour Movement‟  (Minkin, 1991: 4). The metaphor „movement‟ 
connoted not only a permanent alliance, rooted in shared interests, between the „industrial and 
political wings. „What constituted labour as a movement was the belief that each struggle was, or 
could be, linked into a larger social purpose‟ (Hinton, 1983: viii). 
 
That purpose  did not take the form 
of an explicit ideological statement, even of a vision of a new society. Rather it reflected the sense 
that „the movement‟ represented „us‟ – the „common‟ people, „ordinary working man and women‟ – 
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against them – the elites, the establishment, the men of power, property and privilege.  The object 
was not to transform the existing social order but to secure for labour a recognised, legitimate and 
secure place within it. Its ethos was a cautious one, „an ethos of resistance, not of attack; of the 
objects of history, not of the subjects.‟  Rather „it existed to protect “us” against the injustices 
perpetrated by “them”, not to enable “us” to join “them”, and still less to replace “them” by “us”.‟   
(Marquand, 1991: 21-22).   
 For New Labour the  mentality of „us‟ and „them‟ is antiquated.  As Blair told delegates to 
the Labour party conference prior to taking office: „forget the past. No more bosses versus workers. 
You are on the same side. The same team‟  (Blair, 1996).  In effect, New Labour adheres to a 
broadly unitary frame of reference, which discerns no structured conflicts of interest over the 
distribution of material resources, status or power, either at workplace or at societal level between 
capital and labour, employers and employees.  It  views  the social order as fundamentally unified 
and regards both capital and labour as stakeholders in a common enterprise, social partners for 
whom collaboration is the most rational arrangement. Different claims inevitably have to be juggled 
and reconciled but the assumption that if one „side‟ benefits then the other suffers was to 
fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the employment relationship and the realities of a 
modern economy. „Everyone benefits‟, Blair insisted, „employees and business alike‟ (Guardian 9 
Sept. 2003). The essential role of the unions within industry was no longer seen as  „to correct an 
imbalance of power in the workplace, but to create a context in which the productivity and creativity 
of workers is properly harnessed for the good of the firm‟ (Howell, 2004: 14).   
From such a perspective the notion of the party and unions as combined in a  movement,  
bound  together in a „shared historical project‟  which sought to elevate the power and status  of 
„workers by hand and by brain‟  was archaic.   Economic success in an increasingly competitive 
global economy demanded that the needs of business  trump those  of  the trade unions (Taylor, 
2005:  191). „Instead of being in conflict,‟ a minister declared, „the Labour Party and the business 
community are now increasingly   effective partners‟ (Hewitt, 2001).    Industry and finance were 
viewed as  (what may be called) public interest organisations with the right to act as   partners in 
the economic governance of the country. The unions, in contrast, were awarded a   secondary 
status as pressure groups whose demands were sectional since their interests did not objectively 
align and indeed were frequently at odds with the common economic welfare, as now defined.  
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They were no longer excluded and could, indeed,  make a useful contribution to the public realm. 
But it was a modest one as  
„An attendant lord, one that will do 
To swell a progress, start a scene or two, 
Advise the prince; not doubt, as easy tool.. 
Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse; 
At times, almost, ridiculous‟ 
4
 
 As TUC General Secretary John Monks put it, trade unions were often regarded  „as embarrassing 
elderly relatives at a family get-together‟  (Observer June 20, 1999).   
 
 
Conclusion  
For Howell,  the union-party relationship was, in its essentials, a system of political exchange: 
money, votes, mobilising assistance in exchange for legislative advances. In was buttressed by a 
social democratic „industrial relations project‟ which conferred upon the unions a positive and 
substantial role in the political economy. But nowadays, for the party, the gains flowing from the 
exchange are problematic and the industrial relations project has collapsed: it is this, above all, 
„which explains why contemporary social democracy is in the process of divorcing itself from 
organized labour‟  (Howell, 2001: 9). 
This analysis contains more than a grain of truth but it unduly conflates two aspects of the 
party-union relationship, which we can call the pragmatic and the normative. The pragmatic 
grounds which sustain the party-union connection remain quite strong -  despite New Labour desire 
(for electoral reasons) to keep the  unions at arms length, despite the many policy rifts between the 
two, despite even the unions‟ drift to the left. From the unions‟ perspective, whatever the 
disappointments the Government has delivered on a whole range of issues, including the National 
Minimum Wage, the enactment of union recognition procedures, the enhancement of individual 
employee rights,  the ending (for the most part) of EU opt-outs, the efforts poured into eradicating 
mass unemployment, the major boost to public spending and the phasing out of the two-tier 
workforce.  From the party‟s perspective, the unions remain a ready supplier of  funds, personnel 
                                                     
4
 T S Elliott „Love Song of J Alfred Pruffock‟.  
 18 
and campaign mobilisation efforts. Ironically  (given New Labour‟s hopes) in some ways its 
dependence has intensified as other sources of help have dried up: membership is in free fall,  
constituency organisation is falling rapidly into disrepair and  donations from benefactors rapidly 
tapering off. Without the unions, party organisation and constituency campaigning would probably 
be falling apart. 
This, of course, helps explain the readiness of the Government to make a battery of 
concessions at the Warwick Agreement in  the run-up to the 2005 general election. By the same 
token,  the  predominantly left-leaning leadership  in the major unions has no desire to detach 
themselves from the Labour party. As  pragmatic, realistic  and seasoned political  operators they 
are fully aware that, in the present set-up, the only available political  vehicle for the advancement 
of union interests is the Labour party. The  Conservative electoral revival is likely to intensify that 
attachment. Cameron may be seeking to distance his party  from its Thatcherite legacy but the 
terrible gashes inflicted on the unions in the long Tory reign  will need far more time  to heal before 
union leaders will be able to contemplate another Conservative  government with anything  other 
than deep apprehension and alarm. 
But if it is highly premature to pronounce the end of the party-union connection its 
normative (as against pragmaticl) aspect  is rapidly fading.  The old  „ties of sentiment and loyalty 
and agreed ideological commitment‟, as Robert Taylor has put it, are  decaying (Taylor, 2000).  
There is now little sense of shared social purpose, of engagement in  a common project.  The 
notion of the labour movement – „this great movement of ours‟ - as the ultimate repository of loyalty 
and solidarity is evaporating, scarcely  even surviving as a rhetorical device. The era of „the labour 
movement‟ is quietly drawing to a close.  „Tigmoo‟ may soon be as dead as a dodo. 
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